a Passover-offering, though not fit [if slaughtered] during the rest of the year under its own designation, is nevertheless fit [if slaughtered] under a different designation! — A Passover-offering during the rest of the year is a peace-offering. (1) Shall we say that the following supports him [R. Hilkiah]? [It was taught:] You might think that I also exclude (2) a burnt-offering which is premature in relation to its owner, (3) or a Nazirite’s guilt-offering and a leper's guilt-offering; (4) therefore it says, an ox’, [implying] in all cases; ‘or lamb’, [implying, in all cases; or goat’, [implying] in all cases. Thus he omits a sin-offering. Now what are we discussing? If we say, [when it is sacrificed] in its time, (5) why particularly a guilt-offering; even a sin-offering too [entails liability]? Hence it must mean [when it is] not [sacrificed] in its proper time; and in which [case]? If we say, [when he sacrifices it] for its own sake, why is he liable for a guiltoffering? (6) Hence it must surely mean [when he sacrifices it] under a different designation! (7) — In truth it means in the proper time and under a different designation, and this is in accordance with R. Eliezer, who maintained: We assimilate the guilt-offering to the sinoffering; and he teaches the derived case, and the same law applies to the principal case. (8) Come and hear: You might think that I include a burnt-offering which is intrinsically premature (9) and a sin-offering [which is premature] either intrinsically or through its owners; (10) therefore it says, And hath not brought it unto the door of the tent of meeting’: Whatever is not eligible to come to the door of the tent of meeting, you are not liable on its account. But [the Tanna] omits a guilt-offering. Now what are we discussing? If we say, [when it is sacrificed] for its own sake, let him not be liable in the case of a guiltoffering too? (11) Hence it must surely mean [when one does] not [sacrifice it] for its own sake! (12) — This agrees with R. Eliezer, who assimilates the guilt-offering to the sinoffering; and he teaches the principal case [the sin-offering], and all the more [does it apply to] the derived case. Come and hear, for when R. Dimi came, (13) he said: The school of Bar Liwai taught: You might think that I also exclude a burntoffering which is premature through its owner, and a Nazirite’s guilt-offering and a leper's guilt-offering [etc.]. Now, he [the Tanna] thus infers that one is liable, but I do not know how he infers it. Said Rabina: [The reference is:] ‘an ox’, in all cases; ‘a sheep’, in all cases; ‘a goat’, in all cases. But he omits a sin-offering. And what are we discussing [etc.]? (14) What difficulty is this? (15) Perhaps [it is to be explained] as you stated [in the previous discussion]? — Said R. Nahman [b. Isaac]: Because this teaching of the school of Bar Liwai contradicts what Levi taught, viz.: As to a Nazirite’s guilt-offering and a leper's guiltoffering, if one slaughtered them under a different designation they are valid, but do not free their owners of their obligations. If one slaughtered them before they were due from their owners, or if they were two years old when they were slaughtered, they are unfit. (16) [And R. Dimi answered:] (17) There is no difficulty: In the one case [he slaughtered it] for its own sake; in the other it was not [slaughtered] for its own sake. (18) R. Ashi pointed out a contradiction between our Mishnah and the Baraitha, (19) and he reconciled them; one means [where he slaughters it] for its own sake; (20) the other [where he does] not [slaughter it] for its own sake. Shall we say that this refutes R. Huna? — R. Huna can answer you: The case we discuss here is that of one who set aside two [animals for] guilt-offerings, as security, (21) so that one of them was a burnt-offering from the outset,

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(1). ↑ Hence when one slaughters it as such, he is slaughtering it for its own sake.
(2). ↑ From the implication of the text, ‘and hath not brought it unto the door’, etc.
(3). ↑ E.g. one brought by a leper or a woman after childbirth before they were fit.
(4). ↑ Disqualified for some other reason. — I might think that these do not entail liability when sacrificed without, since they were not eligible within.
(5). ↑ And for its own sake.
(6). ↑ Since it is not eligible within.
(7). ↑ Thus what is not fit within under its own designation is fit under a different designation.
(8). ↑ R. Eliezer maintains that a guilt-offering too is disqualified if slaughtered under a different designation, which he infers from the sin-offering (supra 10b), which is thus the principal instance of such disqualification. The Baraitha teaches that nevertheless when one slaughters it under a different designation without, he is liable. The reason is because even after he abrogated its name as a guilt-offering, he could still slaughter it within without any specific purpose, when it would count as a valid guilt-offering and free its owner of his obligation. Hence at the time that he slaughtered it without, under a different designation, it was fit for slaughtering within. The same law applies to the sin-offering too, this being the leading case of unfitness, as explained. This must be in accordance with R. Eliezer, because the Rabbis maintain that a guilt-offering is valid when slaughtered under a different designation. Hence it is fit to be received within, and no special text is necessary for showing that he is culpable.
(9). ↑ E.g., if one sacrifices it before it is eight days old.
(10). ↑ E.g. a leper's and a Nazirite’s sin-offering, sacrificed before it is due. — I might think that if one sacrifices these without, he is liable.
(11). ↑ Since it is not eligible.
(12). ↑ Thus this supports R. Hilkiah and refutes R. Huna.
(13). ↑ V. p. 46, n. 1.
(14). ↑ The reasoning then follows as above. — The text is in some disorder, and the emendations of Sh.M. and Margin have been adopted.
(15). ↑ Why do you cite this to refute R. Huna?
(16). ↑ Hence, if slaughtered without under such conditions, they do not entail liability, in accordance with the general rule that what is unfit within does not entail liability without. Thus it contradicts the earlier teaching.
(17). ↑ Sh.M. deletes bracketed words.
(18). ↑ The school of Bar Liwai means that he is culpable if he slaughtered it under a different designation; while Levi teaches that they are unfit (and hence entail no liability without) when slaughtered for their own sake. (Accordingly, the two clauses of Levi's teaching do not deal with the same circumstances.) Now, since R. Dimi opposed these two Baraithas, he must have known that the former too applies where the guilt-offering is slaughtered prematurely, and thus it refutes R. Huna. (R. Huna presumably rejects this reasoning.)
(19). ↑ Our Mishnah states that one is not liable in the case of a leper's guilt-offering, whereas the Baraitha states that one is.
(20). ↑ Then he is not liable.
(21). ↑ In case one is lost, the other should be sacrificed.